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It Takes a Village to Make a Difference:
Continuing the Spirit of Copyright
By Stella Brown*
The year is 2003, and Betty Lu Brown, a now-famous blues singer and songwriter, sits in
deep thought reminiscing about her successful and long-standing music career. She
continues to hear her music played over the radio and through the car windows of her
now-mature fans, even though she has not released an album for over a decade. Each
time she hears her music playing, she cannot help but wonder how much money her
publishers and record labels are making from her music, compared to her own earnings.
She was very young when she signed her contract and transferred her copyright rights to
the music entities. She had no idea her music would produce so many hits.
Betty is now debating whether she should take advantage of 17 U.S.C. § 203, a provision
added to the Copyright Act of 1976 that would allow her to terminate the transfer of
rights she gave away thirty-five years prior in 1978. According to the statute, 2003 is the
first year she can provide the music entities with notice of termination. Because her first
album came out in 1978, and she wrote and sang each song on the album, Betty’s rights
can revert back to her in the year 2013. That year will be the first time anyone can
terminate a grant of transfer.
On the other hand, Betty recognizes that her record label and publisher make a lot of
money from her songs and may not want to give back her music. She also understands
that she might have to go to court, but is worried about the outcome. She wonders what
arguments her publisher and record label will have, as well as how courts will handle
this novel issue. Betty knows she has a lot to think about and only a short time to
make a decision.
This Note will discuss the issue of copyright termination and the difficulties songwriters
and music artists will experience when they attempt to terminate the grants in their music
that they provided to publishers and recording labels beginning in 1978. The Note
addresses this issue in two ways through the context of the Scorpio Music S.A v. Willis
case. First, the Note provides the many arguments publishers and recording labels will
argue in an attempt to keep rights in songwriters’ and music artists’ songs. Secondly, the
Note provides the counterarguments from the songwriters and music artists that will
likely outweigh the arguments of the music entities. The Note concludes that the
songwriters’ and artists’ arguments will likely be most successful and that only time will
tell which side the court system will seem to favor.
*
J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Peter DiCola for
his continued support during the drafting of this article, and for helping me to think critically about many of
the issues and arguments raised by copyright termination.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

Beginning in 2013, every year will bring with it the opportunity for music artists
and songwriters to reclaim rights they gave away thirty-five years prior. 17 U.S.C § 203,
introduced by the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”), allows them to do so.1 The
provision allows artists and songwriters who granted transfers of their copyrights in their
works to publishing companies and recording labels in 1978 to be the first group to
terminate those rights in 2013.2 As artists and songwriters exercise their termination
rights, publishing companies and recording labels will offer many arguments why they
are entitled to hold on to the music. Given the forthcoming terminations and decrease in
the industry’s revenue within the past few years, recording and publishing executives feel
1

Though 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) applies to all areas of copyright, this paper will focus on termination in
the music context.
2
17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
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especially pressured to produce revenue. They possibly need the royalties that extend
from those musical works and sound recordings.3 The upcoming years could bring with
them an immense amount of litigation between creators and intermediaries (publishers
and record labels).
This Note will discuss the effect of the termination provision, introduced in the
1976 Act, on the music industry through an examination of the decision of Scorpio Music
S.A. v. Willis.4 Part I will discuss the duration of copyright, the renewal right under the
Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”), and its replacement by the termination right. Part II
will give an in-depth discussion of the termination procedure and its relationship to the
relevant exclusive rights under the current statute. Part II will also explore an argument in
favor of a revised termination provision presented by a Congressman on the Committee
on the Judiciary, a subcommittee that focuses on the area of intellectual property,
competition, and the Internet.5 Part III will discuss how exclusive rights are assigned
between songwriters and publishers, as well as between music artists and record labels.
Part IV will go on to discuss the case of Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis and possible future
arguments that will be raised by publishing companies and record labels during litigation.
Part V will discuss the consequences of the Scorpio decision on the music industry,
individual artists, and the public interest. Additionally, this part will address why courts
should hesitate to side with the publishing companies and record labels when it comes to
an artist or songwriter exercising her termination right. Part VI will conclude.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT DURATION

¶3

To better understand termination rights, it is necessary to learn how the duration of
copyright was structured under the 1909 Act and how it works today. Under the 1909
Act, published works displaying the proper copyright notice were granted a twenty-eightyear term of copyright protection.6 The copyright owner was required to renew the
copyright if she wanted an additional twenty-eight years of protection.7 The 1909 Act
required the application for renewal to be made “within the year prior to the expiration of
the original term of copyright and [set] forth a schedule listing those to whom the right
shall accrue.”8 Additionally, if the copyright owner transferred the copyright during the
first term, the copyright would revert back to the author once the second term began.9 On
the other hand, if the copyright owner failed to file the renewal, the copyright protection
would expire at the end of the original twenty-eight-year term.10

3

See Laura McQuade, Record Companies Prepare for Another Copyright Battle in 2013 Over
Termination Rights, in BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 1, 1–2 (Oct. 27, 2011).
4
No. 11cv1557 BTN (RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
5
See About the Judiciary Committee, U.S. H. REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
http://judiciary.house.gov/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). The House Committee on the
Judiciary has jurisdiction over other areas of interest in addition to intellectual property.
6
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1978).
7
Id.
8
Theodore R. Kupferman, Note, Renewal of Copyright—Section 23 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 44
COLUM. L. REV. 712, 714 (1944).
9
Copyright Act of 1909 § 23.
10
Id.
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Essentially, authors were given the opportunity to have a second bite at the apple
through reversion. If they were unhappy with the contract under which they transferred
their rights the first term, they could renew and grant the copyright to someone else or
keep it for themselves the following term. For example, if a songwriter granted a
publishing company his copyright in a prospective hit song during the first term, he could
renegotiate his contract with the company at the time of renewal to receive a higher
royalty percentage. Otherwise, he could take his song elsewhere during the
following term.
The 1976 Act, carried over the renewal system for existing works and increased the
length of the renewal term to forty-seven years.11 In 1992, there were many concerns
about the abrupt expiration of copyright protection for those who forgot to file a renewal
notice.12 And after famous movies, such as It’s a Wonderful Life and Pygmalion, lost
copyright protection, Congress eliminated the requirement of a renewal notice; this made
all renewals automatic.13
II. TERMINATION UNDER CURRENT LAW

¶6

Under current law, the copyright for post-1978 works by a single author lasts for
the duration of the author’s life plus an additional seventy years.14 The copyright for a
work created by joint authors, if not a work made for hire, lasts for the life of the last
surviving author plus seventy years.15 Not only has the copyright term been extended, but
the 1976 Act added § 203, creating a right to terminate transfers.16 The statute states,
in part:
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by
will, is subject to termination . . . thirty-five years from the date of publication of
the work under the grant . . . .17

¶7

When Congress expanded the protection given to copyright through the Act, it
made sure artists and songwriters who transferred their copyright in songs to music
entities had an opportunity to reevaluate those transfers. After reevaluating, artists and
songwriters were to determine whether to continue the status quo, negotiate for more
money, or look elsewhere. The renewal process was replaced by the termination right.

11

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 15A, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 1, 2 (2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf.
12
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 161 (3d ed. 2010).
13
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11; see also ROPERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY,
PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 78 (2013).
14
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
15
Id. § 302(b).
16
Id. § 203(a).
17
Id.
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A. The Termination Provision
¶8

The statute provides a stringent procedure for artists and songwriters who want to
terminate a transfer of copyright. According to the statute, the artist or songwriter must
serve a notice of termination on the music entity grantee
at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years
from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the
date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from
the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.18

The statute also requires the artist or songwriter to state the termination effective date in
the notice and to serve the notice between two and ten years prior to the specified
effective date.19 On the specified effective date, all rights that were covered under the
grant revert back to the artist or songwriter.20
B. Relationship between Termination and Exclusive Rights of Copyright
¶9

In the music industry, because any of the five exclusive rights of a copyright may
be transferred, the termination right affects and applies to all of those rights:
reproduction, distribution, performance, adaptation (ability to create derivative works)
and display.21 Because exclusive rights are divisible and can therefore be transferred
individually, they can also be terminated individually.22 Songwriters and music artists
usually transfer the first four exclusive rights to their respective music entities so that
those entities can fully exploit their music. In essence, music publishers and labels
acquire most of the exclusive rights. They obtain the rights needed to exploit the music
commercially, such as selling copies of the music and licensing it to the radio. This
process is unfair to the artists and songwriters because it is only after this exploitation and
these transfers of copyright that they could learn their music is worth much more money
than they are receiving. The termination statute is meant to remedy this issue by giving
artists and songwriters “a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for [their]
creative efforts.”23
¶10
Due to the collaboration of artists and songwriters with the labels that record their
music and the publishers that promote their music, there is often ambiguity about
copyright ownership.24 Recently, individuals have argued that the termination provision is
unclear and should be revised because of this ambiguity. In 2011, Congressman John
Conyers Jr., the Ranking Member on the House Committee on the Judiciary and a
supporter of artists’ rights, argued that Congress should revise the copyright law to
remove the ambiguities surrounding exactly who can reclaim ownership of songs and
18

Id. § 203(a)(3).
Id. § 203(a)(4).
20
Id. § 203(b).
21
Cf. id. §§ 106, 201(d)(2).
22
Cf. id. § 101 (stating that copyright ownership can be transferred by any means of conveyance).
23
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990).
24
See infra Part V.
19
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sound recordings.25 The congressman also claimed that labels make an enormous amount
of money from the work of music artists “without fairly distributing these profits to
the artists.”26
¶11
Though the congressman’s first argument is a fair one, there are downsides to
changing the statute. First, the legislature would have needed time to revise the law
before 2013, when grants of copyright transfers could revert back to artists and
songwriters who terminated their grants. The year is currently 2014, and the legislature
has not yet passed a revision. As a result, litigation will likely be heavy between artists
and songwriters and the music entities. Secondly, though Congress can overrule judicial
precedent, litigation has already started, and Congress should wait to see if judicial
resolution is sufficient before revising the statute. Lastly, the court in Scorpio Music S.A.
v. Willis did not find the statute to be ambiguous; the court relied heavily on the literal
meaning and legislative intent of the statute when reaching its decision.27 As more courts
rule on this statute, it will become more transparent to the music industry.
¶12
The Congressman’s second claim, however, is quite true. Artists usually are not
paid enough for their music at the outset. As this paper will later discuss, artists are
initially unaware of the value of their songs, but once the music labels and publishers
exploit the music, a truer value is determined. The statute Congressman Conyers speaks
of, 17 U.S.C § 203,28 actually provides artists with a second chance to be paid in
correlation with the value of their music.
III. SONGWRITER-PUBLISHER AND ARTIST-RECORD LABEL RELATIONS
¶13

As previously stated, termination will affect both recording artists and songwriters;
they both have an option to terminate transfers of copyright in their music. The next
portion of this paper will explore the way songwriters and artists typically transfer their
copyrights in music to their respective entities.
A. Songwriter-Publisher Agreement

¶14

A contract between a songwriter and a publisher contains a set of unique elements
referred to as “deal points.”29 These deal points include “the rights transferred between
the parties, the length of the agreement, the number of recordings to be made, and the
financial arrangement between the songwriter and the publisher.”30 First, the songwriter’s
transfer of copyright to the publisher is the most important part of the contract.31 As
stated earlier, this transfer allows the publisher to exploit the songwriter’s music and
financially gain from that exploitation. Second, along with the transfer of rights in current
songs, songwriters will often also agree to transfer rights in their future compositions.32
25

Larry Rohter, Legislator Calls for Clarifying Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at C1.
Id.
27
See infra Part IV.
28
See supra Part IIA.
29
Todd M. Murphy, Note, Crossroads: Modern Contract Dissatisfaction as Applied to Songwriter and
Recording Agreements, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 795, 800 (2002).
30
Id.
31
See id. at 801.
32
See id. at 802.
26
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This means that the songwriters agree that all compositions they make during the period
of their contract with the publishers will solely be made for the exploitation of their
music by the publishers.33 This is also referred to as a term-songwriter agreement.34
¶15
Third, terms are usually tied to the delivery of a predetermined number of songs.35
If individuals are hit-writing songwriters, they may be able to give an approximate
number of songs they will deliver during each period of the term.36 Additionally, if the
individuals are songwriters with clout, they have a better chance of getting publishers to
move the term forward, despite the songwriters’ failure to deliver all the songs they
promised.37 Finally, though there are specific percentage arrangements with respect to
sheet music, all income from a songwriter’s compositions is traditionally split fifty-fifty
between the songwriter and the publisher.38 Performance monies are paid directly from
performing rights societies39 to the songwriters.40
¶16
Though songwriters must agree to a multitude of varying terms, the publishers have
duties as well. Through contractual agreements, publishers assume the obligation to
exploit the compositions using their administrative rights.41 These administrative rights
allow publishers to find people to use the songs,42 grant those users licenses,43 and ensure
artists and songwriters receive payment.44 Publishers indeed play an important role in the
success of their songwriters.
B. Music Artist—Recording Label Agreement
¶17

A contract between an artist and a recording label contains deal points differing
from those present in a songwriter–publisher contract. The relevant points for this
discussion are: how many (record commitment), how long (term), and delivery
requirements (type). Some of these elements illustrate how record deals seem to be more
favorable for the labels than the artists.
1. How Many Tracks or Albums?

¶18

Most labels will commit to record a certain number of albums, usually one
(referred to as “firm albums”), while maintaining the option to require an additional five
to six albums, each one at the label’s discretion (option albums).45 Sometimes they may

33

Id.
DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 281–82 (8th ed. 2012).
35
Id. at 285.
36
Id. at 285–86.
37
Id. at 286.
38
See id. at 220–21.
39
Performing Rights Societies (PRSs) license performing rights to a publisher’s entire catalog to places
such as radio and television stations, concert halls, etc. The publisher receives a share of the fee charged for
every license a PRS negotiates. See id. at 238–40; infra Part V.
40
PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 277.
41
Id. at 219–20.
42
Id. One of the responsibilities of a publisher is to introduce the artist’s music to film producers for
soundtrack music; magazines for articles, cover shoots, etc.; and recording labels for purchase.
43
See infra Part V.
44
PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 219–20.
45
Id. at 104.
34
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commit to record only one or two masters.46 This allows the label to see if an artist has
potential, while giving the label the option to drop the artist if they are not worth the
price.47 For example, usually, if a label decides to commit to two albums and the first
album is unsuccessful, the label has the right to opt out of recording the second album.48
According to Passman, options are never good for artists.49 He argues, “[i]f [the artist’s
music is] a flop, [she’ll] never see the money; if [the artist’s music is] a success, it will
probably be less than [the artist is] worth.”50 Options are a way for record labels to get out
of deals.51
2. How Long Will The Relationship Last?
¶19

After years of figuring out a way to best clarify a time period for an artist contract,
labels have finally adopted a custom of using terms. Multiple provisions are included in
contracts either to keep labels in check (based on prior litigation) or to make sure artists
do not have more control than they should. The first provision states that “each period
ends six to nine months after delivery of the last album required for that period, but it can
be no less than a specified minimum (e.g., eighteen months).”52 A period is a portion of a
term, and a term is the amount of time a record label keeps an artist under an exclusive
agreement.53 Passman provides the following example of this type of provision: “if [an
artist is] required to record two albums, the period might start upon the signing of [the
artist’s] deal and end six months after delivery of the second album, but no sooner than
eighteen months after signing.”54 This provision plainly notifies an artist of the exact
amount of time that constitutes a term.
¶20
A second provision notifies artists that labels can withdraw from a contract if
albums are not delivered within a designated amount of time. The provision usually states
that the label may pull out of the deal if the artist fails to deliver an album “within a
certain period of time after delivery of the previous album (usually twelve to eighteen
months . . .).”55 The time-period is negotiable depending upon the artist’s
bargaining power.56
¶21
The final provision protects record labels from having to accept more than one
album at a time. This provision states that an artist cannot start recording a new album
until she has delivered the prior album “and that the new album can’t be delivered sooner
than six months after delivery of the prior album.”57 This allows the publisher, along with

46
See id. A master is the original recording of a song made in the studio, and the recording from which
all copies are made. Id. at 72.
47
Id. at 104–07.
48
Id. at 104.
49
Id. at 105–07.
50
Id. at 106.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 109.
53
Id. at 107.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 109.
57
Id.
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the artist, to obtain the maximum financial benefit from each album.58 During the periods
of time specified in the provisions, the artist will make records exclusively for the label.59
3. Delivery Requirements
¶22

The delivery requirement relates to the types of music labels will accept. An artist’s
contract will state whether she is to deliver commercially satisfactory or technically
satisfactory recordings. If the contract requires the work to be commercially satisfactory,
the label is only required to take recordings if it believes they will sell.60 In other words, if
a label does not like the commercial prospects of the music, the artist must come up with
something else. On the other hand, if the contract says technically satisfactory, as long as
the recording is technically made well, the label must take it.61 According to Passman, if
an artist reaches superstar level, she will likely have a lower threshold to fulfill under the
technically satisfactory requirement.62 In this case, the label may not have to approve the
recording but may “have language saying the recordings must be of a ‘style’ (and perhaps
even a ‘quality’) similar to [the artist’s] previous recordings.”63 As artists move up the
ladder of success, they are given more control over the music their label releases.
C. Terminating a Contract as an Artist or Songwriter

¶23

While the above deal points seem to provide labels with a large amount of control
and protection, there seems to be none of the same for artists. If a songwriter or artist
becomes unhappy with her publishing or recording deal, terminating either will be very
difficult. There are three ways for an artist or songwriter to terminate a contract with a
music entity: “(1) a decision of the court; (2) a declaration of bankruptcy; or (3) a
reversion of rights.”64
¶24
The action used by a court to nullify the contract is known as rescission. A court
makes a determination after examining the reasonableness and legitimacy of the artist’s
discontent.65 Parties seeking to nullify the contract typically argue “unconscionability,
undue influence, and unequal bargaining power.”66 If the court agrees with one of the
arguments, the contract at issue is nullified and the aggrieved party can be entitled to
damages.67 The second method of termination involves the ability of a person in
bankruptcy to reject undesirable contracts.68 While filing bankruptcy is the most common
tactic used by artists to terminate their recording contracts, songwriters also sometimes

58

Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 171.
60
Id. at 110.
61
Id. at 111.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Murphy, supra note 29, at 806.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). A rejected contract in bankruptcy is treated as though the debtor had
breached the contract immediately before filing their bankruptcy petition, which entitles the contractual
counterparty to damages at the same priority as other unsecured creditors. Id. § 365(g).
59
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use it as a financial tool to terminate an undesirable contract.69 Though this method is not
used as often as it was in the past,70 it remains a tool to assist artists when convenient.
The final method of termination, a reversion of rights, is available to songwriters and may
occur if the publisher failed to adhere to the terms of the contract.71 This method is also
possible when an artist or songwriter terminates her grant under § 203.72
¶25
The first two above-referenced methods are cumbersome, time-consuming, can be
difficult to obtain, and predominantly deal with terminating a contract. Therefore, the last
method is most important because it provides artists with that second bite at the apple and
is likely less burdensome for them.
IV. SCORPIO MUSIC S.A. V. VICTOR WILLIS
¶26

The Southern District of California is thus far the sole court that has decided a case
under 17 U.S.C. § 203 in the music context.73 In Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, Defendant
Victor Willis, a songwriter and former lead singer of the group The Village People,
served a notice of termination on the plaintiffs, music publishing companies Scorpio
Music S.A. (“Scorpio”), Can’t Stop Productions, Inc. (“CSP”), and Can’t Stop Music.74
The songwriter intended to terminate his musical works grant with respect to thirty-three
compositions, including the hit song “Y.M.C.A.”.75 In return, Scorpio filed suit, and
Willis filed a motion to dismiss.76 The court was faced with the issue of whether a
songwriter who composes a piece with other authors and transfers his respective
copyright interest in the piece through a separate agreement can terminate his grant of
copyright, or whether a notice from the majority of the authors is necessary for a valid
termination.77 Scorpio argued that Willis’s notice of termination was invalid under 17
U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).78 In the case of joint authorship, a majority of the authors “who
transferred their copyright interests in a joint work” must terminate in order for any of the
authors to regain ownership rights in the compositions.79
¶27
Scorpio also sought declaration that if Willis was found to have a right to terminate
his transfer, he be limited to the same “percentage ownership as he receive[d] as
compensation relating to the Compositions and as set forth in the Agreements.”80 For
69

See Murphy, supra note 29, at 807.
Justin Pritchard, Striking a Chord with Congress, L.A. TIMES Aug. 19, 1998, available at,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/19/business/fi-14460. During the mid-to-late 1990s, many famous
music artists used bankruptcy as a way to terminate their contracts with music entities and in most
circumstances to “land a more lucrative deal with another studio.” This became such a problem that the
record industry asked Congress to pass legislation to make it harder for artists to use bankruptcy as a means
of ending a contract. Though a bill was drafted, it was never passed by both houses. See id.
71
Murphy, supra note 29, at 807.
72
See supra Part II.
73
Courts have applied the termination provision in other contexts such as superhero comic book
characters. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 11-3333-cv, 2013 WL 4016875 (2d Cir. Aug. 8,
2013).
74
Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557, 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
75
Id. at *1.
76
Id.
77
Id. at *1–2.
78
Id. at *1.
79
Id.
80
Id. at *5.
70
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example, under the Adaptation Agreement signed for “YMCA,” though the song was
written by Willis and two others, Willis received only 20% royalties on the song.81
Scorpio intended to keep Willis’s royalty percentage where it was.
The court ruled against Scorpio and granted Willis’s motion to dismiss.82 The court
held that: (1) a joint author who separately transfers his copyright interest may
unilaterally terminate that grant, and (2) under 17 U.S.C. § 203(b), upon termination, the
author is entitled to the percentage of copyright interests “he transferred—his undivided
interest in the whole.”83 In the case of Willis’s allotted percentage of royalties to
“YMCA,” Willis had a one-third undivided copyright interest in the composition and was
therefore entitled to such upon reversion.84
The court used two methods of statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion.
First, it focused on the plain meaning of the statute. The court analyzed the differences
between joint authors who grant their copyright interests as a unit and authors who
individually grant copyright interests in their portion of the composition.85 The court
interpreted § 203(a)(1) as stating that when a grant is executed by one author, she alone
can terminate the grant.86 A majority of joint authors may terminate a grant if they
together executed the grant.87 The court determined that, because the provision refers to a
“grant” in the singular when discussing joint execution, it is only in that context a
majority is necessary.88 The court further determined that “[i]f . . . a single joint author
enters into a grant of his copyright interest, that author alone can terminate his grant.”89
Second, the court looked at the 1976 Act’s legislative history. To determine
Willis’s ownership percentage, the court relied on the House Report that accompanied the
1976 Act during its passage.90 The Report analogized § 203(a)(1) joint authorship
interests to interests of tenants in common. The Report stated: “Under the bill, as under
the present law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in
common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a
work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.”91 By
analyzing the plain language of the statute and focusing on Congress’s intention, the
court created the initial and only case law precedent on the issue of termination in the
music context.
Though the court dismissed the case, it did grant leave for Scorpio to amend its
complaint. The court allowed Scorpio to seek declaratory judgment regarding the dispute
between the parties about the percentage of copyright interest Willis actually had in
certain songs.92 The court noted that knowledge of authorship was important because it
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would determine how much Willis was entitled to receive relative to the other
joint authors.93
¶32
The court’s decision to allow Scorpio to seek declaratory judgment regarding
Willis’s percentage of interest led to another issue that courts will be forced to handle.
One month following the court’s decision, Scorpio filed an amended complaint seeking a
“judicial determination of the respective shares of the authors of the Compositions.”94
Scorpio claimed Willis translated the song lyrics to the twenty-four songs in dispute and
shares the copyright to the musical work portion of the songs with the original foreign
composer.95 Scorpio also contended that Willis’s assertion that he shares the copyright
with only one other person is barred by a statute of limitations as well as the equitable
doctrine of laches.96
¶33
In contrast, Willis argued that none of the disputed songs were translated by him
and were instead created as new and original works.97 Willis filed a counterclaim for
declaratory relief seeking 50% interest in the copyrights to each of the twenty-four songs
in dispute.98 He argued the foreign songwriter had no claim to half of his interest because
Willis did not translate any of the twenty-four disputed songs to English based on foreign
language lyrics.99 Willis’s counterclaim also added the foreign composer, Henri Belolo,
as a defendant to the dispute.100 Willis alleged Belolo used his power as the managing and
sole director of CSP to negatively affect Willis.101 Specifically, Willis alleged Belolo “has
dominated, controlled, directed, caused, and guided the conduct of CSP complained of
for his own personal gain, benefit, interest, and to the detriment of Willis.”102
¶34
Scorpio responded to Willis’s counterclaim three months later and sought to
dismiss the counterclaim because it was barred by the statute of limitations under 17
U.S.C. § 507(b).103 Under the statute, “[n]o civil action shall be maintained . . . unless it is
commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”104 Scorpio argued Willis had
known about his shared copyright status with Belolo for well over three years.105 The
court depended on the explanation provided by the Zuill v. Shanahan106 court when
making its decision. The Zuill court explained that “claims of co-ownership, as distinct
from claims of infringement, accrue when plain and express repudiation of co-ownership
is communicated to the claimant, and are barred three years from the time of
repudiation.”107 From this explanation, the Willis court determined that “§ 507(b) operates
93
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as it normally does,” even when there is an issue of co-authorship in the context of grant
termination.108 The court lastly denied Scorpio’s motion to dismiss and held that there
was an issue of fact as to whether Willis knew he was considered to have co-authored the
songs with Belolo and, consequently, whether his counterclaim was barred by the statute
of limitations.109
¶35
The percentage-of-interest and co-ownership issues set out above are additional
matters the courts will have to resolve in termination disputes. In the case of joint works,
this leeway will provide publishers and record labels with another way to prolong the
termination process. As the plaintiff in this case has shown, publishers and labels will
want to keep any interests that may revert back to the artist at a minimum.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE SCORPIO DECISION
A. Future Record Label and Publisher Arguments
¶36

Though Scorpio Music v. Willis has created precedent on this issue, there will be a
plethora of litigation far beyond 2013. And although the district court’s decision is not
binding on other federal courts in other jurisdictions, it will likely be persuasive to those
courts. As more litigation arises, music publishers and record labels will have various
arguments. While the music publishers will be concerned with the musical works portion
of the music, the record labels will focus on the sound recording interests.
1. Record Label Arguments

¶37

Record labels may argue that the recordings were a work made for hire. According
to the relevant portion of 17 U.S.C. § 101, a work is a work made for hire if it was
prepared “by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.”110 A work is also
considered a work made for hire if it is (1) “specially ordered or commissioned,” (2) falls
within certain categories of work, and (3) the parties signed an agreement designating it
to be a work made for hire.111
¶38
For example, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, an organization that
advocated for the right of the homeless in America retained an artist to “produce a
sculpture that would depict the plight of the homeless and be displayed at the annual
Christmastime Pageant of Peace in the District of Columbia.”112 The organization paid
$15,000 for the production of the sculpture, but the sculptor did not charge for his actual
services.113 The sculptor accepted most of the organization’s suggestions and directions as
to the sculpture’s configuration and appearance.114 When the sculptor wanted to use the
sculpture for a purpose not related to the organization, the organization claimed the
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sculpture was a work made for hire. The court held that because the sculptor worked in
his own studio, purchased his own supplies, was not provided any type of employee
benefits, and the contract between the parties did not designate the sculpture as a work
made for hire, the sculptor was an independent contractor, and therefore at least jointly
owned the copyright to the work.115
¶39
Though standard recording contracts state that anything the artist records is
considered a work made for hire, labels will have to choose exactly which work made for
hire category the work fits into.116 The grant cannot be terminated if a label can show that
the work was a work made for hire.117 The labels’ most convincing argument is that the
work fits into the compilation category. To satisfy a work made for hire category, labels
may argue that both masters118 and albums are compilations under § 101.119 Under § 101,
a compilation is defined as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
‘compilation’ includes collective works.”120
¶40
Recordings first involve placing music on masters. These recordings are multitrack, “meaning that each instrument and voice part is recorded on a separate track or
channel: the drums on one track, guitar on another, voice on another, etc.”121 Once the
recording is finished, the master is then edited, mixed, and equalized (“EQ’d”).122 This
means the music is spliced, the volume levels for each type of track are adjusted, and the
bass, midrange, and treble levels are balanced.123 Labels will likely base their compilation
argument on this process. Labels could contend that by combining, editing, and adjusting
the levels of multiple tracks, after first recording the tracks individually, the labels in
essence collect and assemble the pre-existing tracks and make them into a single song.
The resulting work could then be considered an original work of authorship, because the
separately recorded tracks are combined to create a single song.
¶41
In case labels lose the argument on masters, they could also argue that a complete
album in itself is a work made for hire. They could argue that taking recordings and
compiling them onto an album in a particular order is enough to fulfill the creativity
requirement under a compilation.124 In this scenario, though the labels would not own a
copyright in each individual song, they would own a copyright to the album itself. To
fulfill the entire requirement,125 labels could also state that they contracted with the artist
for her to provide the voice or instrumentals on the recordings, and that the artist signed a
contract that stated the work was a work made for hire. If the labels are able to prove this
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argument, the album would be considered one made for hire. Though these are the most
realistic arguments on which labels could win, courts have yet to decide whether these
will be successful arguments.
¶42
On the contrary, courts may potentially consider artists to be independent
contractors who own the copyright to the recordings. Courts are less likely to see artists
as employees because labels do not offer benefits, artists are given discretion as to how
long they take to learn and record a new song and make an album, and artists have a
particular skill the labels needs: their voice, instrument playing, or both.126
¶43
In response to labels’ arguments regarding the masters, artists could argue that,
though the labels offered their facilities for the recordings to take place (and even this is
rare),127 they did not contribute enough to the work to obtain a copyright interest in the
work. This argument will be especially beneficial for those artists who play an
instrument, because they are providing both the voice and music; they could argue that
the labels only provide a background for the artists. This argument is supported by the
fact that, over time, artists have come to be the individuals who hire and pay royalties to
the producer.128 Similar to what the labels could claim is their function, a producer “is
responsible for bringing the creative product into tangible form” as a recording by
“finding and selecting songs, deciding on arrangements, [and] getting the right vocal
sound.”129 The producer also has administrative duties such as booking studios and hiring
musicians.130 Though the duties above are satisfactory to establish the title of author to
the producer, it is due to the producer’s subordinate position that he or she is not the
author. The producer is solely commissioned by the artist to enhance her music, and,
thus, anything the producer creates is in essence a work made for hire for the artist.131
¶44
In response to the labels’ argument regarding albums, artists could argue they own
the songs on the albums. If artists are found to own the copyright to the individual songs,
the record labels’ album argument will become moot. For example, if a record label
created an album by combining the songs of an artist already determined to have a
copyright in those songs onto one album, the label would essentially be attempting to
create a derivative work without the owner’s permission.132
2. Publisher Arguments
¶45

Publishers could also argue they are entitled to retain the rights to music because of
joint authorship. Unlike the joint authorship argument in Scorpio, some publishers may
consider themselves to be one of the joint authors. Some “creative” publishers combine
their own writers with other songwriters, “help them fine-tune their writing, match
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writers with artists, etc.”133 By functioning in the described manner, these publishers
could say they have contributed to the overall work. To succeed in that argument, the
publishers will have to show that they significantly contributed something to the
originality and creativity of the piece.134 This argument will either succeed or fail
depending upon whether another court interprets the statutory language concerning joint
authorship termination in the same way the Scorpio court did. If other courts determine
that a separate transfer of a songwriter’s partial ownership in a song will allow them to
unilaterally terminate that transfer, a publisher’s partial ownership as a joint author of the
song will not void the artist’s eligibility to terminate so long as the artist executed a
separate transfer. Additionally, the success of the argument will depend on the specific
facts of each particular case. If later courts follow suit with the Scorpio court on similar
factual cases, the publishers will only be successful if they can prove the songwriter
transferred her interest to the publisher as a joint work.
¶46
Secondly, publishers may attempt to argue that the work was a work made for hire.
By bringing together different songwriters, as well as connecting music artists with
songwriters, publishers could argue they brought together the individual parties for the
purpose of creating specific musical works. Framed this way, the argument sounds as
though the publishers commissioned a compilation; they brought together multiple
individuals who would create new collective songs. This argument is unlikely to be
convincing because songwriters are usually seen as joint authors when they create songs
together.135
¶47
The reasoning under the second argument may work best under a collective works
argument. According to 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), one person can have a copyright in an entire
work, while contributors to that work maintain a copyright in each portion they
contributed.136 For example, a publisher could combine two different sections of a song
that were written by two different songwriters. The songwriters would have copyrights in
their individual portions, and the publisher would have a copyright in its compilation of
those sections. Only time will tell if courts apply termination to works made for hire in
the same manner the Scorpio court applied it to joint authorship.
B. How the Scorpio Decision Affects the Music Industry
1. The Way Business is Currently Done
¶48

The termination of transfer provision and the decision rendered by the Scorpio
court could have a major effect on the music industry. Publishers as well as record labels
may experience a large decrease in royalties, while individual artists and songwriters may
gain an immense amount of bargaining power that will likely lead to a higher royalty
percentage. This section will explore how publishers and labels currently make a large
portion of their money and how those portions will change or disappear.
¶49
Music publishers make a significant amount of their money by asserting their right
to reproduce and distribute the musical compositions, or musical works, through the
133
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granting of two types of licenses: mechanical and performance.137 “Mechanical licenses
are the most common tool used to account for a composition’s profits . . . [and] account
for the profits generated by the physical copies of the composition.”138 This type of
license serves as the main royalty source for a publishing company, because record labels
pay publishing companies for the right to use a song in records.139 Though a publishing
company could issue these licenses itself, most use the Harry Fox Agency to do so.140
¶50
Performance licenses make up most of the rest of the income that publishing
companies receive on compositions.141 “A performance is any means through which the
public is exposed to the songwriter’s work.”142 By using performance rights societies
such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and
Broadcast Music, Incorporated (BMI) to sell blanket licenses to radio and television
stations, concert halls, etc., publishers receive a share of the monies collected.143 The
societies will usually split the income fifty-fifty between the songwriters and the
publishers.144 The more popular a song or artist, the more money record companies and
venues that want to use and perform the music will be willing to pay.
2. Changes
¶51

Due to the interpretation of § 203 by the Scorpio court, publishers will no longer
retain the distribution and reproduction right if the songwriter chooses not to negotiate. If
the songwriter does choose to renegotiate, and her music has brought the publisher a
large royalty income, the publisher will likely improve many deal points the songwriter
requests (though the fifty-fifty royalty income will likely remain the same because it is
standard). In either scenario, whether a songwriter chooses not to negotiate and take their
music elsewhere or negotiate for a larger royalty percentage, the publishers will make
less money than they do now. Record labels will be affected in the same way, with the
exception that, because they deal with some exclusive rights publishers do not, they will
no longer have the right to license the sound recordings for distribution, reproduction, or
performance. Also, because the termination provision allows for the termination of both
exclusive and non-exclusive grants of transfers or licenses of a copyright, both entities
will be affected by the absence of the right to create derivative works.145 However, they
will be able to continue utilizing any derivative works that were prepared under the
authority of the grant before its termination.146 This limitation does not extend to the
137
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preparation of other derivative works based upon the copyright work after
the termination.147
¶52
As a result of the Scorpio decision, once songwriters recover their rights to
distribute and reproduce their work, they will no longer have to go through the publishing
company or the Harry Fox Agency. If an artist chooses not to bargain for a better deal but
instead executes her reversion right in her copyright, record labels will have to receive a
license directly from the artist, while venues would have to do the same for a
performance license. On the other hand, record labels will be able to obtain a compulsory
license on the songs as long as they pay the statutory rate.148 As this relates to the Scorpio
case, if Willis chooses not to negotiate and instead terminates his transfer of rights to the
publisher, he will have his full ownership percentage of rights back in each composition
and will therefore receive money that the publisher no longer will.149 If Willis at any point
decides to serve a notice of termination on the record label for his interest in the sound
recording, he would also receive his portion of rights in the sound recording. In the end,
when an artist who is a songwriter terminates her grant of copyright with both the
publishing company and the record label, she would own the copyright interest in the
entire song (assuming the song is not a joint work). This would make the artist or
songwriter a one-stop shop for those in need of mechanical and performance licenses.
¶53
Those music artists who choose to renegotiate with their publishers and recording
labels, and continue to make albums, may receive other benefits in addition to the
bargaining power related to royalties they procured through the Scorpio decision. In
essence, those artists obtain leverage and become similar to superstar artists—those who
will not have to deal with options.150 The artists will have the power to walk away
following the completion of each album, instead of giving the record labels the option to
commit to two albums while having the power to require an additional four or five at the
label’s discretion.151 If an option remains, superstars will likely be more successful
negotiating increased royalties for the optional albums.152
¶54
For those artists or songwriters who choose to take their music to another publisher
or record label, not only will they benefit from the higher royalty percentage they will
receive, but they will bring in royalties for the new entity they have chosen to contract
with. Those new entities will obtain the rights to license the music, and therefore, collect
monies as the songwriters’ or artists’ music continues to be physically sold and
digitally downloaded.
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3. Public Policy
¶55

The Scorpio decision serves a powerful public policy interest as well. The
interpretation of the statute by the court shows that copyright continues to protect the
interest of the author of a work. The decision also serves the purpose of incentivizing
others to continue to make music without fear of permanently losing their rights to the
publishers and music companies that may take advantage of them in the beginning.
Additionally, it can be argued that the decision puts individuals on notice regarding joint
authorship; if one chooses to participate in a joint work, she should transfer her interest in
the work through a separate agreement.153
¶56
The Scorpio decision could also have a negative effect on social policy. At the
outset of a recording or publishing deal, labels and publishers are now aware that at least
one court has interpreted § 203 to mean artists and songwriters can terminate transfers
thirty-five years later in their own songs and songs they created jointly. As a result, there
is a possibility artists will receive even worse deals. Publishers and labels, in attempts to
get the most out of their investment, may negotiate even lower-paying royalties and less
favorable deal points. Though this is a possibility, this negative effect does not exceed the
benefits that come with the Scorpio decision. Although artists may receive worse deals,
they will know that thirty-five years later they will have a chance to change them. All a
good artist needs is for her music and talents to be exploited. After that, she not only
understands the worth of her music, but music entities understand that the artist is aware
of that worth as well.
C. Why Courts Should Hesitate to Side with Music Publishers and Record Labels
¶57

There are valid reasons why courts should be hesitant to side with publishing
companies and record labels regarding termination. First, new artists and songwriters
enter into contracts that are not legally sound and financially fair due to their ignorance of
the business, along with other things.154 By ruling in favor of the publishers and labels, it
would be as though the court is encouraging the music entities to continue exploiting less
sophisticated musicians. Second, as illustrated in earlier sections, it is quite difficult for
an artist or publisher to get out of a contract, let alone to receive her copyright back in her
works. Not giving artists and songwriters back their copyrights would equate to the court
taking away that second bite at the apple that Congress intended: the chance for artists
and songwriters to renegotiate their agreements. Lastly, if the courts side with publishers
and labels, they run the risk of deterring individuals from entering the business solely
based on fears of never being able to own their music again.
VI. CONCLUSION

¶58

The year 2013 was an important year for many artists and publishers, and 2014 will
likely continue to bring with it an abundance of litigation. Due to § 203, music publishers
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and record labels may no longer be allowed to indefinitely receive large royalties for
certain songs while their true authors receive very little. Though publishers and record
labels will contest their requirement to relinquish ownership of the music under
arguments related to works made for hire and joint authorship, courts will likely consider
artists and songwriters to be independent contractors. Also, though litigation will be very
costly for the music entities, it is fair to argue that the publishers and labels might lose
much more money if they are unable to hold on to the rights of certain songs. Those
songs that have made a lasting impression not only in the United States but across the
world have brought publishers and labels financial security that they cannot afford to
lose. Nonetheless, despite what the loss of copyright interests will do to the music
business, the courts should be more concerned with continuing the true and overall
purpose of copyright: to promote the progress of creativity by authors.155
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